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*   *   * 
 
 
Cultural Manifolds 
 
The Way and the Word exemplifies a method of historical study that makes sense 
of the past in ways that more conventional approaches frequently fail to do.1 
Historians of Asian science tend, for instance, to look at computational tech-
niques and the social relations of mathematicians as distinct areas of inquiry. 
Putting something in context is, as one author after another reminds us, a good 
thing, but doing so is a voluntary matter of connecting two things that exist quite 
separately. Scholars rarely ask what unifies a problem’s philosophical, technical, 
social, economic, political, literary, and other dimensions. Choosing one of these 
dimensions to study, ignoring the rest because one is not a specialist in them, is 
more usual. The cost is often a stunted understanding. 
The Way and the Word is an experiment in doing away with foreground and 
context, and studying the emergence of science in each culture as what I call a 
cultural manifold. Cultural manifolds include not only the various dimensions of 
a complex phenomenon, but also the interactions that make all of these aspects 
into a single whole. That whole includes how people make a living, their relation 
to structures of authority, what bonds connect those who do the same work, how 
                                                 
∗ This article is based on a lecture delivered at the “3rd International Symposium on 
Ancient Chinese Books and Records of Science and Technology: Historical Foundations 
and New Ideas” held at Tübingen University from March 31 to April 3, 2003. Hence it is 
also published in the proceedings of the conference edited by Hans Ulrich Vogel, Gao 
Xuan and Christine Moll-Murata. Permission to publish in EASTM was kindly granted 
by the conference volume editors. 
1 Lloyd and Sivin (2002). 
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they communicate to each other and to outsiders what they have understood, and 
what concepts and assumptions they rely on. I do not think of social factors 
determining thought, nor of ideas determining social change. The point is to 
comprehend the interactions within each manifold as thinkers respond to, but at 
the same time influence, institutions and prevalent values.  
That is why in The Way and the Word we do not speak of inquiry in context. 
Context is not an autonomous setting that may or may not be pertinent to in-
quiry. Technical work and its circumstances are parts of a single complex phe-
nomenon. Our effort to show the differences in how people thought about the 
physical world in early China and in the domain of Greek culture led us toward 
what we believe is a more productive approach to comparison. It is not new in 
general historical studies, but little work on Chinese science and medicine has 
taken advantage of it.  
 
 
The Calendar Reform of 1280 
 
The purpose of this essay is to apply the concept of cultural manifolds to several 
additional examples, some comparative and some not, to demonstrate the range 
of its usefulness. My main example comes from a study of the Season-Granting 
astronomical system (Shoushi li 授 時 暦, 1280).2 Historians of astronomy often 
call this system the high point of the Chinese computational tradition. If we 
study all of its dimensions, we can understand why this remarkable group of 
innovations came together during a wrenching transition between dynasties. 
Many kinds of technical novelty converged in the Season-Granting reform—
to name a few, a remarkable simplification in recording numbers, a new method 
of exact interpolation, a greatly improved approximation of spherical trigonome-
try, redesigned instruments, and a survey that collected observational data over 
an unprecedented range of sites. It is hard to imagine more unlikely circum-
stances for them to coincide. This reform, after all, was planned to begin a Mon-
gol occupation. The Yuan was the least Chinese of all major dynasties, ruled in 
1280 by an emperor who could not read Chinese and probably spoke little of it.3 
                                                 
2 Although li often refers to a calendar (or, more accurately, an ephemeris), the 
“Treatises on Mathematical Astronomy” (li zhi 暦  志) use li primarily to mean the 
schemes of computation that I call astronomical systems. They reduce the complexity of 
the celestial motions to a series of routine steps that functionaries with limited skills can 
use to calculate the ephemeris for the coming year.  
Speaking of mathematical astronomy as “calendrical science” misses the point. It ob-
scures the basic similarity between the Chinese technical literature, Islamic tractates 
(usually called “tables”), and Western treatises from Ptolemy to Peuerbach. The calendar 
was the political rationale of palace astronomy, but it was the astronomers’ least challeng-
ing work. 
Pp. 97-104 of this essay is an abridged and revised version of Sivin 2005.  
3 Franke (1953), pp. 28-41.  
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This regime ended a devastating war that the Mongols had waged for forty years 
since they conquered North China. The dynasty was to last less than a century.  
In 1276, the Song government in Hangzhou surrendered. It appeared that the 
war was over, although it actually dragged on for three more years. To celebrate 
the prospect of victory, in that year the Mongol ruler launched the Season-
Granting reform, putting in charge seven Han Chinese, only one of them an 
astronomical official. This was at a time when the Yuan authorities generally 
gave Chinese officials as little independent authority as possible.  
Why then was this reform so successful? Scholars who believe that innova-
tive science depends on Great Men have usually explained it by the genius of 
Guo Shoujing 郭 守 敬 (1231-1316), the lowest-ranking and the second young-
est of those who planned and carried out the project. He was indeed a talented 
instrument designer and organizer of observations, and no doubt a competent 
mathematician. Still, historians who give him credit for the whole project are 
ignoring the others on what was after all a large team. He is so prominent, I 
believe, mainly because he was one of only two main participants to live past 
1282—the only surviving protégé of the powerful man who first proposed the 
reform. He therefore became responsible for writing up the documents we de-
pend on.  
In order to investigate who did what work and why, we need to look at the 
cultural manifold of the project. To be brief, I will consider its political, bureau-
cratic, personal, and technical dimensions. Excellent modern studies by Profes-
sors Ho Peng-Yoke (He Bingyu 何 丙 郁), Li Di 李 迪, Pan Nai 潘 鼐, Xiang 
Ying 向 英, Yamada Keiji 山 田 慶 兒, and others have already described the 
historical events.4  
 
 
Political Dimension 
 
In the first half of the thirteenth century, it would be difficult to imagine a large 
people politically more unlike the Chinese than the Mongols were.5 The way 
most Mongols lived made them highly adaptive, always ready to move, and used 
to fighting. They were tribal, originally with no overarching government. Exac-
tion and division of spoils became the key to power beyond tribal boundaries. 
Large political forms came into being as individuals drew together federations 
that let them extort wealth from agrarian societies such as China. Succession to 
                                                 
4 This essay draws on, among other sources, Li Di (1966); Pan Nai and Xiang Ying 
(1980); Yamada Keiji (1980); Ho Peng-Yoke (1993), pp. 282-299, and other essays in the 
same volume. 
5 The most judicious account of the Mongol empire is in Fletcher (1986); for details 
see Thomas Allsen in Franke and Twitchett (1994). For a map of the Mongol empires at 
Khubilai’s death in 1294, see Rossabi (1988), p. 111. 
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tribal leadership regularly involved violence; building wealth involved conquest 
or the credible threat of it; and everyone took part in internal and external war.  
Chinggis Khan 成 吉 思 汗 (r. 1206-1227) built an empire across an enor-
mous swath of the earth; he and his immediate successors were aware that their 
new imperium could survive only if they kept pushing further and subjugating 
new peoples. They surged forth from their grasslands with remarkable and fear-
some suddenness, doing enormous destruction as they spread. Chinggis kept this 
new culture expanding—to the gates of Vienna, as the cliché has it—by dividing 
his empire among his sons, but from 1242 on it lost momentum and fell apart as 
they died off. As their successors created hybrids of their traditional culture and 
those of the peoples they ruled, the cultures within what became five empires 
mutated variously and irreversibly. As part of this long process, the Mongols 
vanquished the Jin dynasty of the Jurchen people in North China in 1234, and 
the west and south of the Song empire by 1276. 
The conquerors of North China were poorly prepared to rule over a sedentary 
agricultural and urban population. They saw their new subjects largely as pro-
viders of money, supplies and manpower for further conquests. Since the Mon-
gol leaders were not used to reading and writing, they put together an admini-
stration from surrendered Uigurs, Jurchens, Khitan, Chinese, and others. It ex-
tracted wealth at high human cost. This new model of government terrified the 
Southern Song Chinese, and made a negotiated surrender unthinkable.  
Khubilai 忽 必 烈 (1215-1294) was not only the first Mongol to rule all of 
China, but he made victory possible in the first place by inventing a style of 
government that the southerners could understand and eventually accept. He was 
able to do this because, as a young man, he gathered around him an inventive 
group of Chinese advisors. One of these was Liu Bingzhong 劉 秉 忠 (1216-
1274). As a Chan monk, Liu joined Khubilai’s entourage early, and became his 
main advisor and tutor in Chinese culture. Although he avoided official ap-
pointments, his informal power was immense. Liu was among the many Chinese 
literati whom Khubilai especially esteemed because of their skill at what he 
called “yin-yang.” Mongols used this label to lump together the arts of prognos-
tication: mathematical astronomy, judicial astrology, and every sort of divination. 
Educated people who studied one tended to study them all. 
As early as 1251, Liu Bingzhong suggested a calendar reform, as one of the 
ways Chinese would recognize of asserting legitimate imperial authority. In 
1273, he presented a concrete proposal, which would have put him in charge. 
Nothing came of it, and he died the next year. But in 1276, Khubilai, certain that 
all of China would soon be in his hands, gave the order. Ritually marking the 
unification of China was an important matter, and a new system for generating 
the calendar was symbolically indispensable. Liu had intended it to be more than 
a standard symbol of dynastic change. He wanted to take a step forward in tech-
nical practice as well.  
Another characteristic of Mongol politics is very much to the point. Mongols 
enjoyed the diversity of their trans-Asian order. They did not think of other peo-
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ples as barbarians, as Chinese did, or want them to adopt their own culture. They 
drew avidly on the strengths of the many peoples they had brought under their 
sway. Among those who offered new systems of mathematical astronomy before 
the final victory of the Mongols, for instance, were Chinggis Khan’s companion 
the Khitan statesman Yelü Chucai 耶 律 楚 材 (1190-1244) as well as the Per-
sian Jāmal al-Dīn (Zhamalading 札 馬 剌 丁, fl. 1267-1291), who became a high 
official in China.6 But by 1276 Khubilai appreciated Liu Bingzhong’s point that 
to mark the victory, and to ease the occupation, a recognizably Chinese system 
was essential. 
 
 
Bureaucratic Dimension 
 
Song technical officials generally had been entrenched, with overlapping re-
sponsibilities. Sometimes they colluded to deceive their superiors, but did not 
necessarily cooperate when they were supposed to do so, and were always 
poised to evade responsibility if their predictions failed. Astronomy was, in other 
words, part of a true bureaucracy. This time, however, the organizers of the 
reform (I will introduce them shortly) got round the organizational inertia. They 
chose their own colleagues. They used the authority of the Great Khan to situate 
the project in a new, independent organization, with its own new observatory, 
insulated from the organizational inertia.  
When the calendar reform group began organizing in 1276, it became the 
third of three contemporary astronomical institutions. There were already Chi-
nese and Muslim Directorates of Astronomy (Han’er qintianjian 漢 兒 欽 天 監, 
Huihui qintianjian 回 回 欽 天 監). Both were expected to observe, compute 
annual calendars, interpret astrological omens, and file reports. The Islamic 
observers had a set of instruments that Jāmal al-Dīn brought from the observa-
tory at Marāgha in northwest Persia—unless, as is more probable, what he 
brought were models. The newest armillary spheres the Chinese had were about 
150 years old, and not in good working order. These institutions did not have the 
equipment they needed to operate effectively. No one expected their astronomers 
to do anything more than routine work.  
It was essential to ensure that the bureaucrats in the older organizations could 
not hinder the ambitious new project.7 Those in charge had enough power to 
situate it in a working group separate from the old offices, with a new observa-
                                                 
6 See Hartner (1950). Some documents give the name as Zhamaluding 札 馬 魯 丁. 
Yamada Keiji (1980), pp. 48-52, has argued that he was not from Marāgha but from 
Bokhara. 
7 Stasis seems to have been the norm in palace astronomical bureaux. For an example 
of Song sinecurists blocking innovation, see Shen Gua 沈 括, Mengqi bitan 夢 溪 筆 談 
(Brush talks from Dream Brook), written between 1081 and 1095, juan 8, in Hu Daojing 
(1960), item 149. 
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tory and headquarters that they designed. The new group innovated greatly in 
four politically turbulent years. Seven people planned, directed and supervised 
the project (eight if we include Liu Bingzhong, the most important planner, but 
he did not live to direct it). One had been brought from the south. The rest held 
diverse non-astronomical posts in the middle and upper ranks of the regular civil 
service. The full staff of the commission included 77 officials, ranging in rank 
from 2a, a very high grade, to 9b, the lowest; 44 student observers; and employ-
ees below civil service rank whom no source took the trouble to count. 
To comprehend how this diverse and highly competent group came together, 
we have to investigate the personal relations of its members. That is inevitably a 
long story, but as stories go, it has a simple plot.  
 
 
Personal Dimension 
 
The seven Han Chinese officials who took the largest part in planning and run-
ning the project did not have much in common except for their interest and skill 
in astronomy and divination. The only specialist among them was Chen Ding 陳 
鼎, the official astronomer who had carried out the Southern Song dynasty’s last 
calendar reform in 1271. He was war booty. When the Mongols conquered 
Hangzhou, they captured him and shipped him north. All the rest had been long-
term protégés or supportive colleagues of the powerful Liu Bingzhong. Zhang 
Wenqian 張 文 謙 (1217-1283), as a child, had been a fellow student of his. Guo 
Shoujing’s grandfather, who raised and educated Guo, was a close friend of 
Liu’s. He sent Guo to become Liu’s disciple. Wang Xun 王 恂 (1235-1281, the 
operational head of the team) was another of his disciples. Zhang Yi 張 易 (d. 
1282) had been part of the same scholarly community as Liu. Liu or someone 
close to him introduced all of them to Khubilai, who took them into his circle of 
advisors. The ruler added Xu Heng 許 衡 (1209-1281) and Yang Gongyi 楊 恭 
懿 (1225-1294) to it because of their fame as exemplary teachers of the Song 
Confucian doctrines that were just reaching the north. They then stoutly sup-
ported Liu in adapting and building Chinese-style institutions  
What first attracted Khubilai to each of them, in addition to their talent, am-
bition, and desire to please, was the same thing that drew him to Liu Bingzhong, 
that is, their “yin-yang”—skill at divination, astrology, and astronomy. They 
were working not for a faceless, alien state apparatus, but for a patron who knew 
them well and rewarded them generously. 
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Technical Dimension 
 
Reforms of the century before 1280, such as the one that Chen Ding carried out 
for the Southern Song in 1270-1271, were perfunctory. Few were based on 
original observations or mathematical methods. Some were a little better than 
their predecessors, and some were worse. If all a ruler and his highest officials 
needed was something to symbolize a new cosmic order, they were likely to be 
satisfied with whatever their celestial bureaucrats could easily produce. But 
Khubilai and his advisors had devoted their lives to bringing China under Mon-
gol dominion. With victory in sight, they wanted a political order on the Chinese 
pattern that would enable peace and stability without compromising the power of 
the Mongol nobles. Naturally, what mattered were the symbolic innovations that 
upheld the imperial charisma. Among the most important of them was a calendar 
reform. 
As we have seen, the palace already had Jurchen (by Yelü Chucai) and Mus-
lim (by Jāmal al-Dīn) astronomical systems and tables.8 But it did not accord 
them official status. It demanded a system that its Chinese subjects could recog-
nize as purely Chinese. It discouraged its Han, Central Asian, and other as-
tronomers from sharing information. It is not surprising that the Season-Granting 
system shows remarkably little non-Han influence. Not until the Ming period 
could Islamic and Han astronomers communicate freely with each other.  
One reason the new Chinese-style system was so impressive is that this was 
by all accounts the most elaborate and expensive reform ever carried out. It in-
volved a new observatory, outfitted with a set of large bronze armillaries and 
other instruments, some of them unprecedented in design. Guo Shoujing also 
built two 40-foot high brick gnomons with a kind of pinhole camera that deter-
mined with remarkable exactitude the length of the tropical year, one in the capi-
tal (now Beijing) and one in present-day Dengfeng 登 封, Henan.9 Teams of 
observers also carried out a great latitude survey with portable equipment at 27 
locations scattered from Siberia southward for 3600 miles.10 They recorded for 
each site time differences of eclipse observations, variations in the ratio of day 
length to night length, and changes in the latitudes of the sun, the moon, and 
possibly the planets.  
Khubilai was also ready to pay for a new level of detail in evaluating the ac-
curacy of the new system. The ancient observational records that the team used 
to test their new techniques are the same ones used for that purpose in one dy-
nasty after another. Astronomers not only drew on data in books, but also chose 
from an archive of observations passed down from one dynasty’s observatory to 
                                                 
8 Yelü’s system was largely built on Chinese models, but was based on observations 
in Samarkand.  
9 Zhang Jiatai (1978); Bo Shuren (1963); Mercier (2003). 
10 Listed in Yuan shi 元 史 (History of the Yuan), Zhonghua shuju ed., 48: pp. 1000-
1001.  
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the next. The Yuan astronomers included in their tests a series of early eclipse 
observations that specified not only the day but the time of the eclipse, often to 
the nearest quarter of an hour. Those records were, by and large, quite accurate. 
The Yuan group used them systematically and profusely, not only because of its 
high standard, but because its funds permitted it to do that.  
At the same time, this massive support was double-edged. It enabled some 
kinds of innovation, and hindered others. It is easy to appreciate the ingenuity 
that went into the system’s eclipse technique. It combined third-order interpola-
tion that allowed a step ahead in accuracy with new developments in something 
close to spherical trigonometry. It comes as something of a shock, then, to see 
how stale and unimaginative its planetary technique is. Most of it, surprisingly, 
turns out to be a copy of its counterpart a century earlier in the Jin regime.11 
Although the Yuan astronomers did extend their improved interpolation method 
to the planets, on the whole their technique still could not have reliably predicted 
most planetary phenomena.  
One would have to be naive to conclude that the group was good at lunisolar 
astronomy but incompetent at planetary astronomy. That much becomes clear 
when we examine the “Evaluation of the Season-Granting system” (Shoushi li yi 
授 時 暦 議).12 In this detailed report, the Yuan astronomers used ancient re-
cords to test the important features of the new system. They did not evaluate the 
planetary theory at all. In other words, they hid the inadequacies of which they 
were certainly aware. Among the project’s voluminous unpublished documenta-
tion, the largest component was 50 juan of planetary observations. The most 
obvious explanation is that the authors were unprepared to do computational 
justice to these data.13
Their predecessors for many centuries had not been notably more concerned 
than they were. It was rare for a system to stand or fall on its planetary tech-
niques. It is not hard to see why. From at least the second century B.C. on, the 
state came to be intensely concerned with eclipses as highly visible omens, 
threats to the dynasty’s mandate. Once astronomers could regularly predict lunar 
eclipses, they ceased to be omens. The difficulty of prediction kept solar tech-
niques at the center of attention until, by A.D. 500, the better systems were fairly 
successful. The political priority of eclipses kept planetary phenomena periph-
                                                 
11 Their source is Zhao Zhiwei’s 趙 知 微, Chong xiu Da ming li 重 修 大 明 暦 (Re-
vised Great Enlightenment system), 1180, in Jin shi 金 史 (History of the Jin), Zhonghua 
shuju ed.; on the planets see 22: pp. 496-519.  
12 It accompanies Guo Shoujing’s account of the Season-Granting system (“Shoushi 
li jing” 授 時 暦 經), submitted between 24 December 1280 and 21 January 1281, in 
Yuan shi, juan 52-55.  
13 See the list of documents in the main source of Guo’s official biography, Qi 
Lüqian (1316), p. 720.  
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eral, no matter how technically interesting they were.14 Astronomers recognized 
that the motions of the five classical planets were very different from each other, 
but coming to grips with those differences would have required sustained, pre-
cise measurement over many years. Yang Gongyi, one of the reform group, 
proposed a program of observations sustained over 20 to 30 years, but nothing 
came of it.15
Precisely because, through history, planetary prediction techniques were a 
weak point, challengers fairly often attacked a current system for such failures. 
By the end of the tenth century, one system was comparing its computations of 
planetary events with those of important predecessors, but even 200 years later 
that had not become the norm.16  
To sum up, the computational power for which we remember the Yuan sys-
tem was the result of a transient need for dynastic legitimacy, a remarkable col-
lection of Chinese talent gathered by a Mongol patron, circumstances that made 
it possible to avoid the stasis usual in palace astronomical institutions, motiva-
tion to overcome technical difficulties that never before had been attacked all at 
once, and lavish support. The reform succeeded so well because of that remark-
able combination of the economic, the political, the bureaucratic, the personal, 
and the technical dimensions. That same cultural manifold makes it possible to 
understand the reform’s limits, particularly its stodgy planetary techniques. 
There would be no point in simply cataloguing all these dimensions separately. 
It is obvious in this example that the interactions within the whole form the di-
mensions.  
 
 
Other Problems 
 
Attention to cultural manifolds can be useful in clarifying other equally compli-
cated historical problems. Let me give four examples. 
 
 
Polymathy 
 
                                                 
14 Even in the Chunqiu 春 秋 annals that begin in the eighth century B.C., the con-
cern with eclipses is not balanced by omens involving planets. Cf. Schaberg (2001), pp. 
100-101. 
15 “To set a standard for future dynasties, it is essential that every year we make 
[new] observations and revise, so that, as [improvements] accumulate over 20 or 30 years, 
we perfect our methods”; see Yang’s biography in Yuan shi, 164: p. 3842. 
16 See the evaluation of the Supernal Epoch system (Qianyuan li 乾 元 暦) in Song 
shi (History of the Song), Zhonghua shuju ed., 70: pp. 1592-1594. 
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In a biography of the Song polymath Shen Gua 沈 括 (or Kuo, 1031-1095), I 
sketched the remarkable breadth of Shen’s interests.17 The subjects about which 
he had something original to say ranged from geology to astronomy to mapmak-
ing to linguistics, and on through ritual, music, diplomacy, military fortification, 
medicine, painting, poetry, tea, and any number of others. I concluded that we 
can explain this scope only when we recognize that in his life politics, civil ser-
vice, personal experience, and technical skills were inseparable.  
I noted in passing an odd phenomenon. Any historian of science will recognize 
the names of Yan Su 燕 肅 (fl. 1016) and Su Song 蘇 頌 (1020-1101). In the 
Northern Song period, these, along with Shen Gua, are the best known among a 
number of technically innovative scholars with universal curiosities.18 The ama-
teur ideal that began to form then regularly included technical enthusiasms. But 
from the Southern Song on, scholars of intellectual breadth rarely include sci-
ence and technology in their writings.  
In North China under the Mongols, as we have already seen, there was an-
other shift. Astronomy, mathematics, and numerology became conventional 
subjects of study, but this trend faded away by the end of Yuan period. The 
reinstitution of regular civil service examinations in 1315 may have had some-
thing to do with it.19 In the Ming, questions on astronomy and other technical 
topics appeared regularly in the imperial examinations. This forced every con-
ventional young man to study these fields, but did not cause a rebirth of activity 
in them among graduates. At the end of the Ming, among the limited member-
ship of what became the “evidentiary research” (kaozheng 考 證) movement, 
writing on mathematics, astronomy, medicine and other fields flourished until 
the mid-Qing.20 This is an instance of repeated transformations in the cultural 
manifold of one clump of technical problems. Understanding these odd vicissi-
tudes will require considering many dimensions of intellectual, personal and 
social identity.  
 
 
Comparative Studies 
 
Let me give a couple of examples of comparative issues that are ripe for investi-
gation.  
We have all had to think critically about what has come to be called the “Sci-
entific Revolution Question” or the “Needham Problem.” I once argued that a 
                                                 
17 Sivin (1995).  
18 On Yan, see Zhang Yinlin (1956), pp. 116-124. For Su, there is a biography in Jo-
seph Needham, Wang, and Price (1960), pp. 5-9, and a rich collection of studies in 
Zhuang Tianquan et al. (eds.) (1993). For another important polymath, see Li Di (1991), 
pp. 73–83. 
19 John Dardess in Franke and Twitchett (1994), pp. 564-565.  
20 Elman (2000), pp. 460-485; Sivin (1995a), pp. 17-20. 
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scientific revolution, by the definition that historians ordinarily use, did take 
place in China at roughly the same time it was taking place in France (and earlier 
than in many other parts of Europe).21 In France as in China, this was a response 
to foreign influence. Some historians have denied that there was any revolution-
ary change in Chinese science. The seventeenth-century transformation in 
mathematics and astronomy did not have the social consequences that they as-
sumed scientific revolutions must have, so they concluded that Chinese were 
incapable of fundamentally rethinking science. To do so they had to ignore the 
scholars of the time whose writings were fundamentally rethinking their tradi-
tion. The evidence such authors left dooms the assumption. The obvious conclu-
sion is that scientific change does not entail social change. And if that is true of 
China, it is true everywhere. What calls for explanation is the idiosyncratic so-
cial revolution that eventually swept over Europe in the aftermath of its Scien-
tific Revolution. By now, in fact, many specialists have shown that Europeans 
used new scientific ideas to block as well as to further social transformation.22  
I encouraged my colleagues to move on and begin to examine systematically 
what did happen when Chinese began to think about Western science. Some, 
especially scholars in China, have done so.23 Others continue to believe that the 
Chinese were not clever enough, or were too rigid, to make productive use of 
Western science until the twentieth century. They have found the “Scientific 
Revolution Question” a pleasant diversion from studies in which guesswork is 
not an option. It has attracted hundreds of disparate and mutually incompatible 
answers, and has led to no useful conclusions.24 The Way and the Word, I hope, 
will encourage more scholars to undertake broadly conceived studies of Chinese 
responses, and perhaps even to compare them with responses in various Euro-
pean countries, setting aside worn-out assumptions about what the results ought 
to be. 
Next, there are a number of striking differences of style in the ways Chinese 
and Japanese chose from and adapted Western learning. What principally inter-
ested Chinese was astronomy and mathematics. Within a few weeks after the 
Manchus marched into Beijing in 1644, they put a Jesuit missionary in charge of 
the Astronomical Bureau. 25  Many influential literati of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries studied and wrote about European astronomy.26 The early 
missionaries also wrote about European medicine, but Chinese showed practi-
cally no interest in that subject for another two hundred years. On the other 
                                                 
21 Sivin (1982).  
22 See the many references in Shapin (1996). 
23 See Han Qi (1999), and many studies by Huang Yilong (Yinong 黃 一 農; for in-
stance, see note 25 below).  
24 Many discussions, typically erudite but inconclusive and mutually contradictory, 
are gathered in Liu Dun and Wang Yangzong (eds.) (2002). 
25 Huang Yinong (1990). 
26 See the list in Sivin (1995a), pp. 17-20.  
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hand, in Japan, the Jesuits’ Chinese writings (ca. 1725) and Dutch textbooks 
(half a century later) introduced astronomical knowledge, but it had no signifi-
cant impact until the 1840’s. Unlike the Chinese, Japanese were extremely inter-
ested in European medical books. Although the government forbade reading 
foreign publications, certain people got their hands on Dutch medical writings, 
translated, and taught them. By the late eighteenth century, there were many 
practitioners of Western medicine in Japan.27
Why were the Chinese and Japanese responses so nearly opposite? Several 
parts of an answer are already discernible. The sources of foreign knowledge 
differed. The involvement of the Chinese imperial government and the Japanese 
military dictatorship was not at all similar. The people who accepted or rejected 
technical knowledge came from different niches in quite dissimilar societies and 
political systems. Such knowledge yielded them entirely different kinds of live-
lihoods. In both countries European medical practice competed with that of vari-
ous Chinese traditions. Chinese thought of the latter as their own millennial 
heritage, revealed by the archaic sages who invented civilization. For eighteenth-
century Japanese, the Chinese and European versions were both foreign, and 
equally exotic. Only by looking at all of these facets and still others can we reach 
historical hypotheses worth taking seriously.  
Finally, in addition to comparing two cultures in the same period of time, it 
would be interesting to compare one phenomenon in China at different times. An 
example that affected science was the ancient usage that forbade an official to 
serve two successive dynasties (buerchen 不 貳 臣). Many scholars went even 
further, refusing to serve a new dynasty even though they had had no prospects 
of a civil service career under the old one.  
This taboo did not hinder the Mongols from enrolling Chinese astronomical 
talent. As we have seen, the southern official Chen Ding provided the Mongols 
with experience that no northerner had. He did not choose to die rather than 
serve, as others had done in previous dynasties. Liu Bingzhong, who came of a 
family that had served the Jin, eagerly went to work for Khubilai, and recruited 
many other experts in “yin-yang.”  
But in the transition from the Ming to the Qing, again from a Han govern-
ment to an alien one, the outcome affected private science rather than that of the 
state. Many exceptionally able people refused civil service appointments, even 
though they had never been Ming officials. They became teachers of astronomy 
and mathematics, and physicians, instead. Mei Wending 梅 文 鼎 (1633-1721), 
Wang Xishan 王 錫 闡 (1628-1682), and Xue Fengzuo 薛 鳳 祚 (ca. 1620-
1680), the best astronomers of their time, are examples. Fu Shan 傅 山 (1607-
1684), an outstanding medical practitioner and author, equally celebrated as a 
                                                 
27 The best account of the astronomical response remains Nakayama Shigeru (1969). 
For the early history of European medicine in Japan, see Sugita Genpaku (1969). 
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calligrapher and painter, was ready to die rather than to accept an appointment 
that the Qing court pressed upon him.28
What accounts for this contrast? A comparison of cultural manifolds in the 
same country but at different times can tell us. All it takes is hard work, thought-
ful analysis, imagination, and an open mind. This list of examples could easily 
be extended, but what matters is what each scholar ready to do research of this 
kind is curious about.  
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